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BEYOND FIRESIDE INDUCTIONS 
GREGORY MITCHELL* 
 Paul Meehl observed some time ago that many legal doctrines de-
pend less for their origins on systematic empirical research than on 
the lawyer’s “fireside inductions,” or “commonsense empirical gener-
alizations about human behavior which we accept on the culture’s 
authority plus introspection plus anecdotal evidence from ordinary 
life.”1 As any evidence professor can tell you, behind many of the 
rules of evidence lurks much armchair theorizing about human na-
ture by eminent jurists and little careful study of human behavior.2 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I am personally 
grateful to the participants in the conference on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institu-
tions: Possibilities, Limitations, and New Directions for investing the considerable effort 
needed to produce the thoughtful articles and comments that made the conference a great 
success. I also appreciate the support provided by Dean Don Weidner for the conference 
and the efforts of Adam Hirsch, Mark Seidenfeld, Jim Rossi, J.B. Ruhl, the members of the 
Florida State University Law Review, and especially Stephanie Williams in the planning 
and administration of the conference.  
  1. Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some Reflec-
tions of a Clinical Psychologist, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 521, 522 (1989) [hereinafter Meehl, Law 
and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript)]. Meehl first wrote about the role of fireside 
inductions within the law in 1971. Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some 
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 65 (1971). Eighteen years later he 
added a postscript to the original article. The version of the article that I cite to contains 
the postscript to the original article and also contains abridgements to the original article. 
A full version of the original article, with postscript, can be found in a collection of Meehl’s 
works. See PAUL E. MEEHL, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical 
Psychologist, in SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PAPERS 440 (C. Anthony 
Anderson & Keith Gunderson eds., 1991). 
  2. The hearsay rule and its exceptions exhibit this tendency to favor fireside induc-
tions over empirical research perhaps better than any other area within evidence law. See, 
e.g., John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psycho-
logical Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (2002) (“Exceptions to the hearsay rule 
grew out of intuitive beliefs about human nature.”); Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the 
Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1170 (“Pending further 
empirical research, legal policymakers seeking answers to questions such as whether the 
hearsay rule should be abolished or modified will have to rely upon their traditional tools 
of history, experience and fireside induction.”). Wigmore, for example, was an important 
advocate of the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule based on his own theoriz-
ing about how people act under stress.  
According to Wigmore, this “immediate and uncontrolled domination of the 
senses” lasts for a “brief period.” During this short time, neither thoughts of 
“self-interest” nor other “reasoned reflection” arise. Therefore, the utterance is 
“particularly trustworthy” and may be admitted despite its hearsay character. 
Wigmore even hinted that such evidence is superior to in-court testimony be-
cause of its spontaneity and closeness to the event. 
Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 170 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  Orenstein also noted: 
Wigmore postulated that precise contemporaneousness was not required to 
meet the excited utterance exception and believed that the doctrine did not 
have a fixed time limit between startling event and excited utterance. . . . He 
believed that duration of stress, rather than exact timing, played the predomi-
nant role justifying this exception to the hearsay rule.  
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Given that evidence law is not the only field overpopulated by lay 
psychologists qua lawmakers, who prefer their own introspection and 
observation to the systematic research of behavioral scientists,3 it is 
somewhat surprising that we have witnessed over the last decade a 
widespread interest in using behavioral studies of legal institutions 
to move beyond fireside inductions as the bases for legal policy.4 Em-
pirical research into trial issues remains vigorous, but the domain of 
law and behavioral science now extends well beyond jury and eye-
witness research to encompass such diverse topics as the behavioral 
foundations of estate tax law5 and the psychology of the plea bargain-
ing process.6 Indeed, one possessed of a short memory and an opti-
mistic outlook might even go so far as to say that empirical legal re-
search has finally become an accepted and important form of inquiry 
within the legal academy.7 
                                                                                                                    
Id. at 171. Wigmore also famously rejected the application of psychological research to evi-
dence law in a scathing critique of early eyewitness research by the German psychologist, 
Hugo Muensterberg. See John H. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of 
Testimony, 3 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909). Wigmore’s view of psychology (at least the part repre-
sented by Muensterberg’s work) as something less than scientific surely contributed to his 
attack on Muensterberg, for earlier Wigmore had written that “jurisprudence is best 
founded and most respected when it keeps pace with the progress of science.” John H. 
Wigmore, Scientific Books in Evidence, 26 AM. L. REV. 390, 390 (1892). 
  3. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
641, 645 (1992) (“I have the impression that legal scholarship is very gradually becoming 
more social-scientific. Yet it remains true that we rely, 99 times out of 100, on unproven 
fireside inductions about how the law shapes conduct.”).  
  4. One measure of lasting interest in a topic is the number of symposia addressing 
the topic over time. Since 1998, beginning with the Vanderbilt conference on behavioral 
approaches to judgment and decisionmaking organized by Donald Langevoort, no less than 
seven conferences (not counting the present conference) have been held with significant 
parts devoted to behavioral approaches to legal judgment and decisionmaking. See Sympo-
sium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human 
Behavior, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003); Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New 
Theories of the Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002); Symposium, Law, Psy-
chology, and the Emotions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1423 (2000); Russel B. Korobkin, Behav-
ioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 103 (2000); Symposium, Rational Actors or Rational Fools? The Implications of 
Psychology for Products Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2000); Symposium, Re-
search Conference on Behavioral Law and Economics in the Workplace, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2002); Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral 
Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (1998). Of course, whether behavioral ap-
proaches to legal judgment and decisionmaking will continue to enjoy such attention in the 
coming years remains to be seen, but a substantial jurisprudential foundation for further 
work in this area has been laid. 
  5. See Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567 (2003). 
  6. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463 (2004). 
  7. See, e.g., Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Ex-
perimental Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 945 (“[M]ore [legal experiments] should be 
used in the future. Experiments are an important addition to the researcher’s toolbox that 
can help achieve our goal of better understanding and explaining our world.”). Consider 
first Julius Getman’s optimistic view: 
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 Part of this recent interest in behavioral research may be attrib-
utable to an increase in the number of law professors with training in 
the behavioral sciences,8 and another part is surely due to the hard 
work of several scholars to bring behavioral insights to a wide range 
of worn-out legal explanations and predictively challenged legal doc-
trines.9 The more attention behavioral studies receive, the greater 
the recognition should be of the substantial payoffs that a behavioral 
analysis of legal institutions can yield. The articles published in this 
Symposium provide excellent examples of the potential payoffs in 
this behavioral approach. 
 One of the main points of Meehl’s critique of fireside inductions 
concerns their unreliability: case-based judgments, despite the confi-
                                                                                                                    
I believe that the highest goal of legal scholarship should be sophisticated in-
vestigation into the reality of people’s lives as an underpinning for the evalua-
tion of legal rules. Empirical study has the potential to illuminate the workings 
of the legal system, to reveal its shortcomings, problems, successes, and illu-
sions, in a way that no amount of library research or subtle thinking can 
match.  
Julius G. Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
489, 489 (1985). William Landes’ comments temper Getman’s optimism: 
[E]mpirical work does not occupy an exalted place at law schools. It would only 
be a modest exaggeration to say that most law professors regard empirical 
work as a form of drudgery not worthy of first-class minds. In the legal aca-
demic pecking order, empirical research does not rank as high as theory. This 
translates into a downward shift in the demand for empirical relative to theo-
retical scholarship in law and economics. 
William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 180 
(2003). 
 For a brief history of organized efforts after World War II to infuse legal doctrine with 
empirical research findings after the upstart efforts of the empiricists within the legal real-
ist movement, see JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 238-57 (1995). Schlegel concludes that the effort to convert law schools 
and law professors to true believers in the value of empirical legal research has not been 
particularly successful. Id. at 251 (“If it is not inappropriate to invoke the memory of Harry 
Kalven, one might capture the team’s overall performance as ‘one hit, no runs, innumer-
able errors.’”). 
 8. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 
1323 (2002) (noting that “[t]he number of dual-degree (Ph.D.-J.D.) law professors is in-
creasing”); see also David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 
335 (2003) (“The research faculty of the future law school will be composed largely of aca-
demics with a strong disciplinary training in one of the social sciences (including fields 
such as philosophy and history) who are also well-trained lawyers with a strong grasp for 
the functioning of law and legal institutions.”). 
 9. Any list of important empirical legal researchers would of course be incomplete, 
but we were lucky enough to have as participants in the conference some of the most active 
and important proponents of the application of behavioral science techniques and research 
to legal topics, including leading jury and judicial behavior scholars and founding members 
of the behavioral law and economics movement, which has done much recently to expand 
the domain of behavioral inquiry as scholars within this movement consider the propriety 
of using the rational-actor assumption to found legal doctrine across all areas of the law. 
See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (1998) (“Something more 
rigorous is . . . expected when normative claims are advanced, and the place of the social 
sciences has expanded in legal discourse to satisfy this expectation.”).  
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dence so often placed in them, typically fail to predict behavior as 
well as judgments based on a linear regression model derived from a 
collection of cases.10 Thus, one of the primary benefits of behavioral 
study is the emphasis on data collection and analysis rather than re-
liance on unrepresentative and unreliable personal knowledge. The 
article by Sharfman,11 with its collection and analysis of judicial 
valuations in bankruptcy, represents the positive preference within 
behavioral studies for more data over less and guided analytical 
methods over impressionistic analysis. As behavioral analysis gains 
more adherents, more and more original empirical research is being 
published in law reviews addressing a broad range of legal topics.12 
 The prospect of gaining new legal knowledge through empirical 
research remains the key impetus behind much of the behavioral 
study of legal institutions, but legal scholars need not conduct their 
own empirical work to use behavioral science evidence in ways that 
lead to more reliable legal knowledge. The articles by Guthrie and 
George,13 Krawiec,14 Paredes,15 and Robbennolt16 demonstrate the 
utility of literature reviews that bring to bear large bodies of existing 
social-scientific evidence to evaluate the status of different theoreti-
cal positions within legal debates. When the collective evidence is 
sufficiently abundant and clear in its conclusions, literature reviews 
can serve a falsifying function, demonstrating the incorrectness of 
one or more theoretical positions. When the evidence is less abun-
dant or clear, literature reviews can serve the equally important 
function of clarifying the issues in the debate and directing research 
toward important open empirical issues that must be resolved to ad-
vance the debate.  
                                                                                                                    
 10. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust & Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuar-
ial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1673 (1989) (“The research reviewed in this article indi-
cates that a properly developed and applied actuarial method is likely to help in diagnosing 
and predicting human behavior as well or better than the clinical method, even when the 
clinical judge has access to equal or greater amounts of information.”). 
 11. Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387 (2005). 
 12. Elsewhere I discuss the increasing frequency with which original empirical re-
search is being published in student-edited law reviews and some of the implications of 
this trend. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dia-
logue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167 (2005). 
 13. Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights 
into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
357 (2005). 
 14. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent 
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571 (2005). 
 15. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Fi-
nance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005). 
 16. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Bench-
mark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005). 
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 The articles by Devins and Meese,17 Malloy,18 Rachlinski,19 and 
Stake20 illustrate another important use of preexisting behavioral 
science evidence and theoretical frameworks within the behavioral 
sciences, namely, to analyze recurrent legal problems in new ways 
that draw attention to hitherto unrecognized problems and possible 
solutions. Devins and Meese, for example, raise new concerns about 
judicial review using research on cognitive limitations and an insti-
tutional analysis of appellate case selection.21 They also propose 
novel reforms to the Supreme Court’s certiorari process designed to 
counter biases in the making of constitutional law that result from 
the use of unrepresentative cases presenting incomplete sets of con-
stitutionally relevant facts.22 Devins and Meese’s article is a good ex-
ample of the negative and positive role for behavioral analysis: al-
though behavioral research can be used to deconstruct judicial re-
view, it can also be used to better align case management policy with 
the goal of reaching sound constitutional decisions based on an accu-
rate factual record. It is this positive, constructive role that helps to 
ensure a permanent place in legal scholarship for the behavioral 
analysis of law because that role makes it possible for behavioral 
studies to avoid the ultimately self-defeating nature of critical 
movements that can serve only negative, deconstructive roles.23  
 Another important payoff of the turn toward behavioral science is 
the increase in critical self-scrutiny and critical dialogue that comes 
with the adoption of scientific methods for the collection of evidence 
and scientific standards for the evaluation of evidence and inferences 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 323 (2005). 
 18. Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (2005). 
 19. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspec-
tive, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529 (2005). 
 20. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential 
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2005). 
 21. Devins & Meese, supra note 17, at 325-36. 
 22. Id. at 351-55. 
 23. For instance, Jeffrey Rachlinski noted recently: 
If legal scholars cannot use [behavioral decision theory (BDT)] effectively, then 
BDT has no serious future in legal scholarship, other than providing critics of 
law and economics with another weapon. If so, then BDT risks devolving into a 
degenerate research agenda with no positive theories, as has been the fate of 
critical legal studies.  
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 741-42 (2000) (footnote omitted). Mark 
Tushnet made similar comments several years ago:  
Perhaps the program of interminable critique swallows itself. If it is widely ac-
cepted, people may at first resign themselves to their inability to transcend cri-
tique. But they may come to see that that inability is itself transcendent, creat-
ing a new form of life in which the terms on which critique must proceed today 
have become unintelligible. 
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 516 (1986). 
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from the evidence.24 Throughout the articles in this issue, we see this 
self-critical attitude, but this positive trait is most on display in 
Bornstein and McCabe’s critical examination of common methods 
used within mock jury research25 and Klick’s reexamination of 
Korobkin’s bounded rationality explanation for consumer acquies-
cence to unfavorable terms in standard form contracts,26 as well as in 
the commentaries by Aviram,27 Hirsch,28 Korobkin,29 and MacCoun.30 
This critical dialogue provides an important disciplining effect to 
proponents of behavioral claims: unless a claim can be phrased in 
testable terms (that is, unless the advocate of an idea can specify 
ways that her idea could be proven wrong by others), then the argu-
ment is out of bounds from a behavioral science perspective and 
should be ignored until it can be stated in such terms. 
 A side benefit of this self-criticism is a realization of the limits of 
empiricism, which should create a more cautious prescriptive stance 
within the law and behavioral science scholar. The commentaries by 
Korobkin and MacCoun directly address the important issue of the 
role that behavioral evidence can play in legal policymaking in light 
of the limitations of a behavioral approach. Korobkin advocates a 
“relative plausibility” test for choosing between competing theoretical 
positions in light of the available data,31 and MacCoun advises re-
searchers to be conscious of the policy payoffs associated with differ-
ent research choices, emphasizing that time may be better spent de-
veloping a good theory that policymakers can work from than con-
ducting additional tests to replicate or extend a finding of limited 
theoretical importance.32 
 Indeed, both Korobkin and MacCoun note the success of the law 
and economics movement in influencing legal policy despite the 
dearth of data supporting many of its recommendations,33 a result 
                                                                                                                    
 24. See Mitchell, supra note 12 (discussing the importance of critical dialogue within 
scientific communities to the development of objective knowledge). 
 25. Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005). 
 26. Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Dis-
crimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555 (2005). For Korobkin’s analysis 
of standard form contracts, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). 
 27. Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 763 (2005). 
 28. Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for 
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005). 
 29. Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 781 (2005). 
 30. Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock, Amateur and 
Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (2005). 
 31. See Korobkin, supra note 29, at 791. 
 32. See MacCoun, supra note 30, at 518. 
 33. See Korobkin, supra note 29, at 787-91; MacCoun, supra note 30, at 518.  
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that is due, no doubt, in part to the fact that economic analyses often 
reflect intuitions, common sense, and cultural understandings about 
the rationality of human behavior—which is just another way of say-
ing that economic analysis often tracks powerful fireside inductions 
about behavior.34 So, just as Paul Meehl warned in his original in-
dictment of fireside inductions, we must recognize that behavioral 
science will never free us entirely of reliance on fireside inductions, 
but the behavioral analysis of the law can help us discard our most 
inaccurate and unreliable hunches and replace them with better 
models of behavior in some domains—or at least better hunches.35 
 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Deci-
sions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67, 89 
(Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (“The assumption of rationality has a 
favored position in economics. It is accorded all the methodological privileges of a self-
evident truth, a reasonable idealization, a tautology, and a null hypothesis.”). 
 35. Meehl closed his original article with these still relevant cautionary words:  
Unavoidably, the law will continue to rely upon the fireside inductions. They 
should be viewed with that skepticism toward anecdotal evidence and the re-
ceived belief system that training in the behavioral sciences fosters, but with-
out intellectual arrogance or an animus against fireside inductions in favor of 
overvalued or overinterpreted scientific research. I can summarize my position 
in one not very helpful sentence since nothing stronger or more specific can be 
said shortly: In thinking about law as a mode of social control, adopt a healthy 
skepticism toward the fireside inductions, subjecting them to test by statistical 
methods applied to data collected in the field situation; but when a fireside in-
duction is held nearly semper, ubique, et ab omnibus a similar skepticism 
should be maintained toward experimental research purporting, as general-
ized, to overthrow it. 
Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postcript), supra note 1, at 540. In the post-
script to the original article, Meehl added some good reasons why lawmakers should be 
skeptical of claims based on social science evidence that conflict with the lawyer’s fireside 
inductions. See id. at 540-47. 
 
